Computational Sovereignty
Structural Economic Risks and European Competitiveness
Abstract
This paper examines Computational Sovereignty—the capacity of states and regions to maintain allocative autonomy in AI-mediated markets. We analyze structural economic risks arising from dependence on external computational infrastructure, introduce the Law of Computational Visibility, and examine how Representation Capital affects national and regional competitiveness.
The paper extends the Representation Economy framework to the level of states and regions, examining how computational admissibility constraints affect economic sovereignty, structural competitiveness, and policy autonomy. All analysis is theoretical and requires empirical validation.
Epistemic Status: Theoretical / Non-Empirical
This paper presents a theoretical framework. All claims about economic risks and competitiveness are speculative and require empirical validation.
Core Concepts
Foundational concepts of Computational Sovereignty
Computational Sovereignty
The capacity of states and regions to maintain allocative autonomy when economic participation depends on computational infrastructure.
Law of Computational Visibility
As computational mediation increases, visibility without admissibility becomes allocatively insufficient—being seen is not enough if systems cannot process.
Structural Competitiveness
National and regional competitiveness increasingly depends on aggregate Representation Capital across firms and assets.
Infrastructure Independence
Sovereign control over computational admissibility infrastructure as a condition of economic autonomy in AI-mediated markets.
Citation
How to cite this research publication
APA Style
Patrone, M. (2026). Computational Sovereignty: Structural Economic Risks and European Competitiveness. Representation Economy Research Program, Volume VII. HomeSelf Research. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21215504