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Network-Dependent Allocation

Ranking Under Non-Separable Valuation

June 13, 2026
28 pages
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20680894
Marco Patrone·HomeSelf Research·protocol@homeself.ai

Publication

Archived on Zenodo

DOI

10.5281/zenodo.20680894

Published

June 13, 2026

Version

v1

Citable

Yes

Research Publication Notice

This is a research publication and has not been peer-reviewed. It is presented for research discussion and may be cited as a research publication. Findings are subject to revision.

Status: Research Publication — Version 1.0 — June 2026

Epistemic Status

Propositions 1-3 are formally stated and argued with proof sketches, but full formal proof validation is pending peer review.

NP-hardness claims reference established computational complexity classes (Maximum Coverage, Budgeted Maximum Coverage).

Governance implications require empirical validation.

Downloads & Citation

How to Cite This Paper

Patrone, M. (2026). Network-Dependent Allocation: Ranking Under Non-Separable Valuation. HomeSelf Research. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20680894

Available formats: APA | MLA | Chicago | Harvard | BibTeX

Abstract

This research publication presents a theoretical framework for analyzing allocation problems where valuations are non-separable. The core problem addresses systems where the value of selecting an artifact depends on which other artifacts are selected simultaneously, violating the independence assumption underlying traditional ranking-based selection.

The framework introduces the Network-Dependent Allocation (NDA) problem: selecting a subset R of artifacts with cardinality constraint K that maximizes a non-separable valuation function V(R).

We establish three core propositions: (1) No ranking function can produce optimal allocations for all capacity constraints under non-separable valuations; (2) NDA generalizes several NP-hard allocation problems; (3) For monotone submodular valuations, the greedy algorithm achieves (1 - 1/e) approximation.

The paper concludes by distinguishing retrieval from allocation as formally distinct problem classes, with implications for the design of selection systems that must reason about network-dependent valuations.

Keywords

network-dependent allocationcomputational economicsallocation theorynon-separable valuationscombinatorial optimizationranking systemssubset selection

JEL Classification

Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification codes for this research publication:

C44Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
C60Mathematical Methods; Programming Models
C61Optimization Techniques; Programming Models
C63Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
C70Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C72Noncooperative Games
D83Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge
L10Market Structure, Firm Strategy, Market Performance

Core Allocation Problem

R* = argmax|R| ≤ K V(R)

Where R is a subset of artifacts, K is capacity constraint, and V may be non-separable

Introduction

Selection Under Non-Separable Valuation

Traditional selection systems rely on ranking: artifacts are ordered by independent scores, and users consume the top results. This model assumes that the value of including an artifact in a selection set depends only on that artifact's intrinsic properties.

When selection systems reason over structured representations to construct selections, the value of including an artifact may depend on:

  • Complementarities: What other artifacts provide complementary information
  • Substitutabilities: What artifacts serve as alternatives
  • Network effects: How the artifact interacts with the overall selection structure
  • Coherence: How well the selection forms a coherent set

Theoretical Framework

Problem Formulation

The Network-Dependent Allocation (NDA) problem is defined as selecting a subset R of artifacts with cardinality constraint K that maximizes a potentially non-separable valuation function V(R).

Non-Separable Valuations

A valuation function V is separable if it can be decomposed into independent artifact values. When this condition fails, the valuation is non-separable, and ranking-based selection cannot preserve optimal allocations.

Core Propositions

Proposition 1: Ranking Incompleteness

For any non-separable valuation V, no ranking function exists that produces optimal allocations for all capacity constraints K.

Proof sketch: Assume such a ranking exists. Consider two capacity constraints K₁ ≠ K₂. Since V is non-separable, optimal selections cannot both correspond to the same top-K rankings. Contradiction.

Proposition 2: NP-Hardness

NDA generalizes several known NP-hard problems: Maximum Coverage, Maximum Weight Independent Set, and Budgeted Maximum Coverage are all special cases of NDA.

Reduction proofs show these problems are special cases of NDA, establishing NP-hardness.

Proposition 3: Approximation Bounds

For monotone submodular valuations, the greedy algorithm achieves a (1 - 1/e)-approximation to the optimal NDA solution.

Reference: Nemhauser et al. (1978) - foundational work on submodular optimization.

Computational Implications

Exact Computation

For small problem sizes (|U| ≤ 20), exhaustive search or branch-and-bound can find optimal allocations. For larger instances, exact computation becomes intractable.

Approximation Algorithms

Greedy Algorithm: Iteratively add the artifact with highest marginal value. Achieves (1 - 1/e) for submodular V.

Local Search: Start with an initial selection and iteratively improve by swaps. Performance depends on neighborhood structure.

Domain-Specific Structure

Real-world applications often have structure that can be exploited: hierarchical artifact categories, geographic or temporal constraints, user-specific preference patterns, and representation quality signals.

Research Stack Positioning

Network-Dependent Allocation is part of the HomeSelf Research ecosystem:

References

  1. Nemhauser, G. L., Wolsey, L. A., & Fisher, M. L. (1978). An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions. Mathematical Programming, 14(1), 265-294.
  2. Feige, U. (1998). A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover. Journal of the ACM, 45(4), 634-652.
  3. Cornuejols, G., Fisher, M. L., & Nemhauser, G. L. (1977). Location of bank accounts to optimize float: An analytical study of exact and approximate problem formulations. Management Science, 23(8), 789-810.
  4. Kleinberg, J., & Oren, J. (2019). Mechanisms for skill-based ranking. Proceedings of the 52nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 915-932.

Positioning Statement

This research publication is:

Computational economics contribution
Allocation theory extension
AI-mediated selection systems analysis
Protocol infrastructure requirements identification

This paper does NOT claim universal economics theory, AGI philosophy, SEO theory, or legal/financial advice.